Introduction

Sudan’s story is, in many ways, about what happens when a country’s most valuable resources fall into the wrong hands, and the state itself becomes the predator. For decades, military elites have shaped Sudan’s political economy, steering the country from one crisis to the next. The 2019 popular revolution offered a fleeting moment of hope, but the 2021 military coup shattered it.  By 2023, Sudan was plunged into one of the world’s most devastating civil wars.

At the centre of this catastrophe is a thriving shadow economy, one powered not by formal markets or democratic governance, but by militarised extraction. First oil, then gold. Today, gold is the primary prize driving armed actors on both sides of the conflict: both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are not merely fighting a war; they are financing it through elaborate illicit networks that stretch from remote desert mines to the gleaming towers of Dubai.

What makes Sudan’s case especially troubling is the paradox at its core: both the SAF and the RSF simultaneously serve as state duty-bearers and primary rights violators. Ultimately, this situation demonstrates that traditional Business and Human Rights (BHR) frameworks, which typically focus on corporate due diligence, fail to achieve systemic reform when both state and non-state actors exert total control over the illicit, transnational ecosystems that fuel and sustain modern conflict.

I. The Gold Rush That Feeds the War Machine

From Oil to Gold

When South Sudan gained independence in 2011, it took most of Sudan’s oil reserves with it. The Sudanese government was forced to find a new economic lifeline, and it found one in gold. The Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) sector rapidly expanded to fill the void, which today accounts for approximately 90% of Sudan’s total gold production and employs between 800,000 and 2 million people across the country.

Mining operations are concentrated in flashpoint regions: Darfur’s Jebel Amer mines, the Talodi and Kalogi areas of South and West Kordofan, and the Northern and River Nile states. Because artisanal gold is small, portable, and easily moved across borders, it is a perfect war commodity. It is estimated that between 70 and 80% of Sudan’s gold production bypasses official state channels entirely, flowing instead through smuggling networks to international hubs, principally the UAE and Egypt.

The RSF’s Mining Empire

The RSF, commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, built its financial empire on gold. In 2017, RSF forces seized control of the Jebel Amer mines in North Darfur.

Today, the most critical production hub is Songo in South Darfur, where the RSF’s family-owned holding company, Al-Junaid, operates, processing factories that transform raw ore into export-ready gold.

The RSF has perfected a racket: it functions as a ‘protection force’ in the mining areas it controls, ensuring that artisanal miners sell through RSF-controlled channels while keeping government auditors at bay. 

The SAF’s Hidden Revenue Streams

The SAF is no less implicated. It controls the largest gold-producing regions in the Red Sea, Northern, and River Nile states. SAF extracts revenues through entities under the Defence Industries System (DIS) and affiliated companies, all of which enjoy broad tax exemptions and independent audits. 

II. A Catalogue of Harm: Human Rights in Freefall

The militarised control of Sudan’s extractive industries has not merely distorted the economy; it has generated a systemic human rights catastrophe. The violations are not incidental byproducts. They are, in a grim sense, features of this system.

Violence as Business Strategy

The RSF, described by survivors and human rights organisations as ‘men with no mercy’,  has deployed killings, mass rape, and torture as tools to secure mining territories and silence opposition. In 2019, RSF troops detained and intimidated residents of Talodi who dared to protest against Al-Junaid’s operations. This pattern of violent enforcement has continued and intensified throughout the civil war, with civilians bearing the overwhelming burden.

Displacement and Land Theft

Military-controlled mining and agricultural concessions have uprooted entire communities. In Darfur, the battle for control of the Jebel Amer mines displaced tens of thousands of people as competing militias fought to secure access. 

Environmental Poisoning

Unregulated mercury use in artisanal mining and cyanide processing near water sources, including facilities dangerously close to the Nile River, has created an environmental emergency with no end in sight. In Delgo, processing operations threaten the water supply for local farms and households. Judicial orders to halt these practices have been routinely ignored because the revenue they generate is more important to the war machine than the health of Sudanese communities.

Labour Exploitation

The ‘gold rush’ has made vulnerable people expendable. Sudanese Children and refugees from neighbouring countries work in hazardous artisanal mines, enduring extreme heat, physical danger, and minimal pay with no legal protection. 

Conflict Financing and Humanitarian Collapse

The civil war triggered in April 2023 has produced one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises. More than 12 million Sudanese have been displaced, alarming rates of sexual and gender-based violence have been documented across conflict zones, civilians and civilian infrastructure are targeted with apparent impunity, and famine now threatens more than half the population.  Throughout all of these, the gold mined by both warring parties continues to be the primary fuel sustaining the conflict.

III. Transnational Illicit Trade 

From Mine to Market: The Laundering Pipeline

Sudan’s civil war is sustained not only by weapons but also by sophisticated transnational financial networks. The SAF and RSF  operate what analysts call ‘enclave economies’, that is, business empires that operate entirely outside civilian oversight. 

The porous borders of Sudan enable extensive overland smuggling to neighbouring countries. Since the 2023 conflict, the SAF has increasingly diverted gold through Egypt to prevent it from reaching RSF-backed hubs. It is estimated that upwards of 100 kg of gold is smuggled into Egypt daily, totalling over 60 tonnes since the war began. By contrast, RSF-controlled gold from Darfur is frequently smuggled into Chad, Libya, South Sudan and Uganda for onward transport to the UAE, in return for fuel, weapons, and mining chemicals such as cyanide. 

The journey of Sudan’s unrefined conflict gold is often transported by air to the Dubai Gold Souk, where it enters the global commodities market through a web of foreign intermediaries. Refineries in Dubai process this gold, and through laundering mechanisms, it can ultimately gain London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) certification, becoming indistinguishable from ethically sourced gold. Profits are then integrated into the global financial system through RSF or SAF-linked front companies to purchase military equipment.

Arms, Trafficking, and Regional Spillover

The illicit supply chains that carry gold outward also bring weapons and other illicit commodities inward. In the al-Muthaleth tri-border region, where Sudan, Libya, and Chad converge, smuggling networks move fuel, arms, and hazardous mining chemicals simultaneously. The smuggling activities threaten the security of the whole region due to arms proliferation. 

Meanwhile, gold has been used directly as currency for human smuggling into Egypt, with returning trucks carrying fuel and cyanide for the mines, a closed-loop criminal economy that profits from every leg of the journey.

IV. Accountability

Regional Framework

In theory, the African human rights system offers tools for accountability. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has evolved its position on non-state armed groups (NSAGs), recognising that intra-state conflicts involving irregular forces have become a defining feature of modern violence. Recently, there has been emerging legal recognition that IHRL provisions should apply to non-state actors exercising effective territorial control. The Commission has condemned specific groups like Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab through resolutions. Also, the Kampala Convention explicitly prohibits armed groups from carrying out arbitrary displacement or recruiting children.   General Comment No. 4 of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights also sets out duties for armed non-state groups regarding torture victims.

But these developments remain aspirational. The Communications procedure of the Commission remains state-centric, as cases can only be brought against states, not non-state actors. Recently, the Commission has acknowledged that NSAGs technically fall outside its traditional jurisdiction and recommended a new special mechanism that does not yet exist. In addition, Sudan’s non-ratification of the Protocol establishing the African Court means there is no regional judicial forum capable of delivering binding decisions on accountability to victims.

International Framework “The ICC”

The ICC has jurisdiction over Darfur via UN Security Council referral, but illegal gold and arms trade occur nationwide.  Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute; thus,  the ICC’s jurisdiction over Sudan is limited. 

Domestic Framework

Sudan’s own legal architecture is a study in contradictions. The 2019 Constitutional Document established a genuinely promising foundation: it incorporated international human rights agreements ratified by Sudan directly into the constitutional charter, giving them monist effect without requiring further domestic legislation. It also extended legal accountability to corporate entities for crimes against humanity.

Yet the infrastructure to enforce these provisions is missing. The Sudan Mineral Wealth and Mining Development Act of 2015 contains no concrete environmental obligations, no provisions to address illicit mining, and no accountability mechanisms for companies involved in resource mismanagement. The Sudanese Companies Act of 2015 similarly lacks a framework for corporate accountability on human rights. Additionally, the country lacks a mandatory due diligence law and has no prospect of adopting one soon.

V. Pathways Forward

Given the depth of the accountability vacuum inside Sudan, meaningful reform must be driven from the outside. Several intersecting mechanisms offer genuine leverage, which are highlighted below:

Strengthening the Sanctions Architecture

UN, US, and EU gold sanctions regimes targeting Sudan’s conflict economy must be significantly strengthened. Targeted financial sanctions can disrupt the revenue flows that sustain both the SAF and RSF without punishing ordinary Sudanese civilians.

Mandatory Supply Chain Due Diligence

The most powerful lever available to the international community is mandatory supply chain due diligence legislation in the jurisdictions where conflict gold is refined and traded. The UAE, as the primary refining and trading hub for Sudanese gold, must be required by law to trace the origin of the gold it processes. 

Transnational Litigation

Courts in Europe and the United States retain the capacity to hear cases involving corporate complicity in human rights violations abroad, even where domestic remedies in host states are unavailable. Precedents such as Doe v. Unocal established that companies can be held liable for aiding and abetting abuses by the military forces with which they work. Lawyers, civil society organisations, and affected communities should actively pursue litigation strategies in jurisdictions with both the legal tools and the political independence to act.

Protecting Civil Society and Documentation

None of this is possible without evidence. Sudanese civil society organisations, journalists, and community monitors are doing extraordinarily dangerous work to document violations in real time. International partners must invest in their protection through secure communications tools, legal support, and funding and in building robust evidentiary archives that can support future prosecutions. Documentation is not just a human rights imperative; it is a precondition for justice.

Engaging Regional Trade Standards

Sudan’s limited engagement with African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) standards represents an underutilised opportunity. Regional economic integration frameworks can be leveraged to embed human rights and environmental requirements into trade relationships, creating economic incentives for governance reform that punitive sanctions alone cannot achieve.

Conclusion

Sudan’s crisis represents one of the starkest demonstrations in recent history of how extractive industries, when captured by rogue states and armed actors, become instruments of mass atrocity. Gold’s portability, value, and ease of laundering have given the SAF and RSF the financial autonomy to wage war without popular support, civilian oversight, or consequences.

The traditional toolkit of Business and Human Rights: corporate due diligence, voluntary standards, and domestic regulation, was not designed for this environment. When the state itself is the violator, and when illicit transnational networks insulate armed actors from accountability, reform cannot come from within. It must be imposed from without.

The international community faces a clear choice: continue to allow conflict gold to flow through the global financial system largely unchecked, or use the legal, financial, and diplomatic tools available to impose real costs on those who profit from mass suffering.