Introduction

On 24th February 2022, the world was shaken with Russia’s initiation of a full-scale invasion against Ukraine, recognised by the United Nations (UN) as an act of aggression. This new chapter in interstate conflict raised questions about the alleged human rights impacts of corporate actors linked to gross violations committed in Ukraine. Initially, the responsibility of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) operating in Russia was widely discussed in the early phases of the war. The debate centred on accountability for business activities in the context of conflict, a topic widely discussed within the Business & Human Rights (BHR) field. The ICJ recognised that when serious violations of international law occur, other actors are prohibited from providing support that would help sustain the unlawful situation. Additionally, the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGPs) endorsed a corporate responsibility for adverse impacts on human rights caused, contributed to, or directly linked to the activities of a business.

TNCs remaining active in Russia are at a high risk of being linked to the widespread violations of international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) being committed by the Russian army in Ukraine. Especially now, more than four years after the invasion, when Russia continues rebuilding its economy, allocating funds to militarisation, weapons production and its war efforts in Ukraine. This blog post aims to explore the role of TNCs operating within the Russian war economy by scrutinising the link between human rights due diligence (HRDD) and corporate responsibility. By examining the due diligence framework, this analysis will consider the extent to which business operations, or the mere presence of foreign companies in Russia, could imply a failure to respect human rights. This piece will offer suggestions for post-accountability steps in Ukraine’s reconstruction, considering potential contributions to remediation programmes.

Corporate presence in Russia 4 years after […]

To start with, the fact that the Russian army is committing war crimes in Ukraine is evident, so TNCs are or should be aware of it. Russia’s military spending in 2025 was set at around $190 billion, which was an increase of 3.4 per cent relative to 2024, showing an intention to further escalate, due to peace talks’ failure, which translated in renewed systematic strikes against Ukraine’s energy sector. Russia’s capacity to continue the invasion of Ukraine is premised on the resources derived from fossil fuel trade (€847 billion), the importation of technology (22.000 computer numerical control machines worth $18.2 billion), the growing use of a “shadow fleet”, and tax revenue from TNCs. As of January 2026, only around 547 companies, which is only 13% of the approximate total prior to the invasion, have fully exited the Russian market; 1368 or 32% are in the process of exiting or reducing their activities; and over 2348, amounting to 55% of TNCs, remain there.

Although businesses may not take a direct stance on the conflict, their operations impact its dynamics. TNCs with a presence in the Russian market may, to some extent, facilitate military efforts and are at risk of being involved in adverse impacts related to the war.  As reported by Ukrainian economists, TNCs are among Russia’s highest taxpayers. In fact, 13 out of the 20 companies paying the highest tax bills in Russia in 2023 and 2024 were foreign owned. For instance, a Ukrainian NGO reported that Western companies, through their subsidiaries, are estimated to have paid $60B in taxes from 2022 to 2024, almost 1/3 of the 2025 military budget. By paying taxes, TNCs are arguably subsidising the procurement of weapons and the payment of military salaries.

According to the findings of the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), over 15,000 civilians have died, more than 41,000 have been injured, millions have been displaced, and extensive damage has been done to civilian property and infrastructure since the full-scale invasion began. So, the taxes obtained from market activity provide capital reserves that may be reinvested, voluntarily or compelled, into industries linked to war efforts. In total, the amount in taxes collected from TNCs could have financed over 1 million soldiers, 20,000 Iskander missiles, over 4,000 Kh-101 missiles, and nearly 1.2 million Shahed drones.

As an example, the accumulated and/or produced long-range weapons are later used in Ukraine to commit human rights violations. In 2025, attacks resulted in 35 % of civilian casualties in Ukraine, with 686 fatalities and 4,451 injuries, representing a 66 % increase in the number of killed and injured compared to figures reported in 2024. Therefore, doing business in Russia for an extended period raises concerns about TNCs’ role in sustaining the ongoing hostilities and in financing violations of IHL and IHRL. This issue can be examined through the normative lens of the UNGPs to critically analyse the responsibility of businesses operating in the context of armed conflict.

Due Diligence in a Conflict Zone

According to the UNGPs, companies bear the responsibility to respect internationally recognised human rights. Guiding Principle (GP) 12 lists human rights instruments, including IHL, IHRL, and international criminal law (ICL), all of which impose enforceable obligations on states. By considering the wording of GP 23, in armed conflicts in which widespread human rights violations occur, the risk of potential involvement should be treated as a matter of legal compliance. To address challenges arising from these complex environments, the concept of heightened HRDD was developed as an extension of the standard due diligence process. It implies that TNCs must have a deeper understanding of the context in which they operate, thereby helping anticipate escalations in violations and ensuring that their activities do not materialise in adverse impacts. During armed conflict, businesses cannot claim ‘neutrality’ [para. 43] given their influence on the dynamics of hostilities. So, TNCs active in Russia have an obligation to implement the following due diligence steps [para. 46, 47, 48]: identify the causes of tensions, map the key actors, and examine how their actions contribute to these tensions. Human rights due diligence process should be ongoing, considering that risks may transform over time due to the evolving context and changes in activities.

TNCs should establish effective processes within their operations to address the impact of their actions and adapt to changing conditions. Otherwise, their actions may give rise to adverse impacts arising from armed conflict, which would breach the business’s responsibility to respect human rights. The consequences of such activities lead to three modes of involvement: causing, contributing to, or being directly linked to adverse impacts. These different forms of potential involvement in situations of widespread violence may have comparable implications [p.10] for the risk of engendering human rights abuses. A company that causes or contributes to harm must offer remediation; if there is a direct link to the harm, it should exert its economic leverage to prevent or remedy the adverse impact. The levels of participation exist on a continuum, implying that both responsibility and the following implications can shift along it. So, the alleged contribution to the economy of war should be assessed on how (in) actions of corporate actors relate to the negative impacts on human rights.

Paying Taxes/Doing Business as a Potential Contribution to Conflict

To start with, the conventional stance developed by John Ruggie suggests that mere presence in a state or the payment of taxes is unlikely to establish responsibility for preventing or remediating adverse impact on human rights. Taxes fund essential public services, and assigning responsibility for participation in a state’s economy can further disadvantage oppressed groups and hinder the realisation of human rights. Conversely, it is important to recognise that in some instances corporate behaviour may sustain a war economy and be directly or indirectly linked to adverse impacts on human rights. To better understand the relationship between TNCs and alleged harms, Tara van Ho [pp. 647, 651] identifies five factors: power, independence, severity, predictability, and measures to mitigate such harms. These factors can serve as a framework for assessing the positionality of corporate actors in relation to adverse human rights impacts. In Tara van Ho’s view, TNCs may contribute to harm if they possess power and independence, if the connection to harm is severe and predictable, and if they fail to take steps to mitigate it, even when they are only directly linked to the harm.

Generally, tax payments as a form of financial contribution to the state can only create a linkage to any human rights violations committed by the state. In the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the TNCs which are paying taxes to the Russian state are clearly contributing financially to the war effort, which constitutes an important share of the overall budget of the Russian state. Indirectly, this contribution is also fuelling the documented human rights violations committed by the Russian army in Ukraine. Arguably, TNCs shifted along the continuum from being directly linked to harms to a contribution form due to a significant increase [pp. 30 – 31] in tax payments and a failure to exit promptly. Such an assessment helps determine whether corporate entities have fulfilled their responsibility to respect human rights and, if not, whether their obligation to remedy any resulting harms is triggered. Thus, entities that remain present in the Russian market may arguably be responsible for reparations if they are found to have contributed to adverse impacts caused by the Russian army in Ukraine.

Concluding Thoughts on Potential Reparations

It’s crucial to emphasise that, had proper HRDD been undertaken, TNCs would have long ago disengaged from…(Russia as well). Remaining there might lead to consequences [p. 5] that, absent the company’s involvement, would not have occurred. Even though the question of how corporations might be held accountable for potential violations is acknowledged, progress in this area remains limited. As of March 2026, the existing and emerging compensation mechanisms, Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, and the yet to be established International Claims Commission for Ukraine, do not consider within their mandates the obligations of businesses that have stayed in Russia to provide reparations if it is established that they have caused or contributed to gross IHRL and IHL violations committed in Ukraine.

Corporate actors can support post-war Ukraine’s reconstruction by backing recovery proposals that require significant financial resources, making it important to link reparations, as well with rebuilding efforts. Additionally, as proposed [p. 39], national reparations’ programmes could incorporate compensation measures for businesses that have caused or contributed to or even been directly linked to harms, or remedies can be sought through national or international court proceedings, or via negotiations and agreement processes. When taken together with the Council of Europe’s current efforts, these steps would set up a wider array of remedies to be accessed by the people who have suffered harm. However, in the current political climate, whether any compensation programmes related to business accountability would even be considered remains an open question.