On 25 June 2026, Chamber 34 of the Paris Judicial Tribunal – a specialized court chamber with exclusive competence to hear cases filed on the basis of the French Duty of Vigilance Law – ruled that TotalEnergies’ vigilance plan does not comply with the requirements of the law because the company failed to take into account the risks related to its Scope 3 emissions. This ruling marks a major development in the field of corporate accountability for climate change and the enforcement of human rights and environmental due diligence obligations. It also puts climate change back at the centre of the debate over the scope of application of the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), as the principle of non-regression of domestic law protected under Article 1(2) of the Directive (Subject matter) read in connection with Article 4(2) (Level of harmonisation) should mean that France cannot use the transposition of the EU CSDDD post-Omnibus as grounds to limit the scope of environmental impacts currently covered by the Duty of Vigilance Law.

Brief Facts and Procedural History

TotalEnergies is a French headquartered energy company. It is the largest French company by revenue on the Fortune 500 list and currently ranks 19^th on InfluenceMap’s database of Carbon Majors Entities. InfluenceMap estimates that the company has released over 18,572 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent in the atmosphere since its founding in 1934.

A coalition of French NGOs in collaboration with local municipalities throughout France first sent a letter to TotalEnergies’ CEO in October 2018 reminding the company of its obligation to comply with the French Duty of Vigilance Law and arguing that the company’s vigilance plan should include the impacts its activities on climate change. Following unsuccessful exchanges between the coalition and the company, the NGOs and local municipalities sent a formal notice (“mise en demeure” in French) in June 2019, alerting TotalEnergies that its vigilance plan did not sufficiently account for the climate change risks created by its activities. This was followed by an official court summons on 28 January 2020 in application of Article L225-102-1 II of the French commercial code (the codified version of Article 1 of the French Duty of Vigilance Law, see here for an English translation).

This was one of the very first cases filed before French courts on the basis of this law, meaning therefore that the case faced many procedural hurdles and ultimately years-long delays which plagued the initial years of the law’s enforcement before courts. Following a legal reform which gave exclusive competence to the Paris Judicial Tribunal to hear Duty of Vigilance cases, the case landed on the tribunal’s case dock. A hearing on merits finally took place in February 2026 and the ruling released on 25 June was one of the most highly anticipated decisions to understand the full material scope of France’s Duty of Vigilance Law.

The Ruling

The Duty of Vigilance Law is notorious for its brevity. Article 1 of the law mentions that a company’s vigilance plan must identify and lay out the measures meant to prevent severe impacts on “human rights and fundamental freedoms, the health and safety of persons and the environment.” At the centre of the case is therefore the definition of the term “environment”, and whether and to what extent it covers climate change risks. While TotalEnergies’ vigilance plan ultimately accounted for risks related to Scope 1 emissions (direct emissions from sources owned or controlled by the company) and Scope 2 emissions (indirect emissions from the generation of energy used to power the company’s activities), it failed to mention Scope 3 emissions (all emissions across the company’s entire value chain including the use of its products). This is significant, because Scope 3 emissions are by far the most significant for oil and gas producing companies such as TotalEnergies. From a business and human rights perspective, it also brings into question the extent to which a company can be held accountable for the use customers make of its products.

In a detailed ruling, the court held that the term environment does cover climate change and that Scope 3 emissions do constitute a risk of severe impact emanating from TotalEnergies’ activities and therefore had to be included in the company’s risk mapping. The court referenced multiple international bodies’ works (including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Energy Agency) and drew from the international legal framework on climate change (including the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement and relevant provisions of EU law pertaining to the protection of the environment and climate change objectives). Reflecting yet another example of the “judicial dialogue” on matters of climate responsibility, the court also referenced major climate litigation precedents at the international level (notably citing the European Court of Human Rights’ KlimaSeniorinnen decision, the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on climate change from 23 July 2025), but also at the domestic level with references to the UK Supreme Court’s Finch v Surrey County Council decision from 20 June 2024 and the Hague Appeals Court’s decision in the Shell case from 12 November 2024.

Ultimately, the court grounded its reasoning on the parliamentary debates which led to the adoption of the French Duty of Vigilance Law, and which according to the court’s interpretation should lead to the broadest understanding of the notion of “environment” under the law, and must necessarily include climate change (paragraph 138 of the ruling). In so doing, the court went against the Public Prosecutor’s Office which made use of its prerogative to submit opinions in civil cases and surprised many by arguing that the Duty of Vigilance Law should not cover climate-related risks. The Public Prosecutor’s Office considered that climate change was an international phenomenon which is primarily the responsibility of States and the international community to address.

Nonetheless, and consistent with case law previously established in the La Poste case, the court held that it did not have the power to order the company to adopt specifically defined measures (in this case requiring the company to specifically adopt measures towards carbon neutrality by 2050 in line with the “P1 Scenario” as defined in 2018 by the IPCC). It ordered the company to amend its vigilance plan to account for Scope 3 emissions within 6 months but in so doing leaves the company free to first define what the necessary measures to prevent and minimise these risks should be, including the climate target which should guide the company’s measures. Only once the company has set the specific target and the measures it is putting in place to meet this target, can the court exercise judicial control on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the company’s measures (see paragraph 218 of the ruling). In so doing the court sets a clear sequence: the company must first define how it will prevent the risk which is currently missing from its vigilance plan, and only afterwards can the court exercise judicial control on the chosen measures.

Implications for the Upcoming Transposition of the EU CSDDD

The case must also be read in the broader context of the EU CSDDD’s implementation. All EU Member States have until 26 July 2028 to bring into force laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to implement the Directive (Article 5 of the “Omnibus I” Directive 2026/470). The Omnibus amendments (in)famously removed former Article 22 which concerned climate transition plans. For countries such as France which already has a human rights due diligence law in force, this raises specific questions on the articulation between its current legal regime and that of the CSDDD.

The Directive anticipates this issue to some extent but provides rather convoluted provisions on this question. Article 1(2) of the Directive, following the Omnibus I amendments, provides that:

“This Directive shall not constitute grounds for reducing the level of protection of human, employment and social rights, or of protection of the environment or of protection of the climate provided for by the national law of the Member States […]. However, the first sentence of this paragraph shall not prevent Member States from adjusting any national corporate sustainability due diligence laws applicable at the time of the adoption of this Directive, in particular their scope, with a view to aligning them with this Directive.”

The issue is then was is meant by “scope”. Could France amend its Duty of Vigilance to exclude climate change risks from the broad notion of “environment” currently protected under the law? A few distinct elements suggest that this should not be possible.

For one the term “scope” is only used in the EU CSDDD’s articles to refer to the personal scope of the Directive. Article 2 explicitly named “Scope” defines which entities are subject to the obligations laid out in the Directive. The term is not used to cover the human rights and environmental risks defined in Article 3 “Definitions”. Furthermore, Article 4(2) “Level of harmonisation” (post Omnibus I amendments) specifies that:

“[T]his Directive shall not preclude Member States from introducing, in their national law, more stringent provisions diverging from those laid down in provisions other than Article 6, 8 and 9, Article 10(1) to (5), Article 11(1) to (6) and Articles 14 to 16, or provisions that are more specific in terms of the objective or the field covered, including by regulating specific products, services or situations, in order to achieve a different level of protection of human, employment and social rights, the environment or the climate.”

The inclusion of the climate here is particularly important. This wording suggests that specifically defined procedural aspects of the human rights due diligence process must be identical across Member States, but that the actual nature of impacts covered can be more protective at the national level.

Finally at the domestic level, France does recognize the principle of non-regression on environmental matters in law (Article L. 110-1 II 9° of the Environment Code), although the constitutional protection of this principle remains debated. French legal doctrine has argued in favour of recognising the principle of non-regression under Article 2 of the French Environmental Charter which requires the preservation and constant improvement of the environment. However, the French Constitutional Council, which is responsible for ruling on the conformity of laws with the Constitution, has not yet confirmed nor rejected this interpretation in its own case law. 

Finally, perhaps to put a final nail in the coffin, the Paris Judicial Tribunal articulated its interpretation of the notion of “environment” in light of the EU CSDDD and the Omnibus I amendments in its ruling, considering that the inclusion of climate risks as environment impacts is not in contradiction with the terms of the Directive (paragraphs 141-146 of the ruling).

A combination of all these elements suggests at the very least that should the French legislator attempt to roll back on the environmental risks, including climate risks, covered by the Duty of Vigilance Law in upcoming transposition efforts, strong legal arguments exist against its ability to do so. For companies which fall under the scope of the EU CSDDD after its transposition into French Law, the best way forward is to start taking account of climate risks – including Scope 3 emissions – in their human rights due diligence process.