Environmental protection and regulatory conflicts
Most MEAs listed in the Directive’s annex address adverse environmental impacts, the occurrence of which would amount to a violation of the right to a healthy environment. Thus, compliance with the environmental due diligence obligations by preventing and bringing actual adverse impacts to an end would enhance the protection of the right to a healthy environment. This outcome would be highly beneficial in the context of environmentally impactful industries in which covered companies tend to operate, including in mining, agriculture, manufacturing, and trade in waste.
However, compliance with due diligence obligations could also undermine the right to a healthy environment in a number of ways. Local partners and subsidiaries are likely to find themselves bound both by the Directive and the national environmental laws and standards of the countries in which they operate. Compliance with two streams of environmental regulation could present ambiguities particularly where the requirements of the Directive clash with the environmental standards of African countries in which covered companies operate. For example, in an effort to realise the right to a healthy environment, the African Union adopted the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa (the Bamako Convention). The Bamako Convention imposes stringent requirements for dealing with hazardous waste by imposing a total ban on the imports of hazardous wastes in Africa.
On the question of wastes, the Directive is anchored on, among other instruments, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (the Basel Convention). Unlike the Bamako Convention, the Basel Convention allows movement of hazardous waste as long as there is prior and informed consent from the destination country. Consequently, subsidiaries and partners could face legal and operational uncertainties, potentially forcing companies to adhere to one regulatory framework and ignore the other. Given the centrality of profits as the raison d’être of companies, covered companies operating in Africa may find strong motivations to comply with the less stringent regulatory framework, which imposes lower costs and does not hinder profit-making opportunities.
Furthermore, dual compliance requirements could strain resources, as subsidiaries and partners will likely need to implement divergent strategies to comply with the Directive and the environmental laws of African countries in which they operate. For example, under Article 15, covered companies will be required to carry out periodic assessments to ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of human rights and environmental due diligence processes. This is in addition to similar obligations in the form of environmental auditing standards imposed by the environmental laws of many African countries and for which companies already incur compliance costs. For example, Kenya’s environmental auditing standards require proponents of projects to carry out costly regular audits. If experience with human rights due diligence laws with similar obligations is anything to go by, and it is, then compliant local partners and subsidiaries will likely find it necessary to hire costly sustainability experts to provide consulting and auditing services to ensure compliance.
Environmental information and the problem of symbolic reporting
One of the key elements of human rights and environmental due diligence is the duty that covered companies have to publish annual statements containing “sufficiently detailed information on the description of due diligence, actual and potential adverse impacts identified, and appropriate measures taken with respect to those impacts.” (Article 16(1)(3)). Annual reports could serve as a source of information on companies’ environmental performance thereby enhancing transparency and facilitating greater public scrutiny of corporate activities. Annual reports that reveal failure to address adverse human rights and environmental impacts can be useful in providing evidentiary support for claims by individuals and communities seeking remedies for environmental harm and human rights violations through litigation.
Similarly, annual reports can provide an information base for advocacy strategies spearheaded by affected or at-risk communities that aim to shame non-compliant companies in order to force them to adopt better practices. Beyond the benefits that transparency could bring in supporting litigation and advocacy efforts of affected or at-risk communities, information in annual reports could act as a deterrent by motivating companies to change future behaviour to avoid liability, the penalties contemplated under Article 27 and sanctions imposed by the market such as loss of reputational benefits.
The potential benefits offered by the information contained in annual reports may be severely limited by the quality of those reports particularly in cases where companies engage in symbolic reporting. Symbolic reporting entails the provision of low-quality information that fails to reveal companies’ level of compliance or the low level of negative disclosure. Whereas symbolic reporting could be attributed to lack of reporting infrastructure, it is also the case that companies may decrease negative disclosure to avoid civil liability, penalties and loss of reputational benefits. Importantly, there is danger that the reporting obligation will lead to the production of immense amounts of low quality disclosure (data that tends to describe processes as opposed to outcomes). This possibility is not far-fetched considering that similar challenges have been observed in relation to reports produced under human rights due diligence laws with reporting obligations that are compatible with those in the Directive. Low quality data would be difficult for communities and individuals to aggregate and convert to actionable measures to advocate for better environmental protection information.
Engagement with stakeholders
Article 13 of the Directive requires companies to carry out meaningful and effective engagement with stakeholders. Meaningful or effective stakeholder engagement encompasses the duty to conduct consultations with a wide range of stakeholders. The notion of stakeholders is defined expansively to include employees, trade unions, individuals, groups, communities and entities whose “interests are or could be affected by products, services and operations of that company, its subsidiaries and its business relationships” (Article 1(n)). Second, covered companies are required to provide timely, appropriate, relevant and comprehensive information to stakeholders (Article 13(2)), and third, conduct consultations through the specified stages of the due diligence process. (Article 13(3).
The stakeholder engagement obligation aligns with the right to a healthy environment in several respects. First, meaningful and effective engagement with stakeholders offers an opportunity for involving a broad range of stakeholders in the decision-making processes in respect to the environment, a critical procedural element of the right to a healthy environment. Second, stakeholder engagement would allow stakeholders to obtain environmental information pertaining to environmentally impactful products, services and operations of entities. Access to such information would enable individuals and communities at risk of or affected by environmental damage to demand corrective action from business entities involved in a timely fashion and inform their design of responsive advocacy strategies to clamour for change in behaviour.
Notwithstanding these potential benefits, the stakeholder engagement obligation is inherently limited as it is an obligation of means rather than one of result. In the context of environmental governance, obligations of means such as environmental impact assessment (EIA) processes have been associated with bureaucratic violence. Bureaucratic violence, a form of structural violence, occurs when corporate proponents of environmentally impactful project, sometimes in collusion with environmental administrators, conduct cosmetic EIAs or other process-based obligations to create the illusion of compliance with environmental standards, while simultaneously engaging in conduct that thwarts the goal of environmental protection. This phenomenon is enabled by power disparities between communities and individuals, on the one hand, and public officials and corporate actors, on the other hand.
Companies may exert undue influence over consultation processes by appealing to prominent figures such as politicians, community leaders and regulatory bodies, thus marginalising community voices. This is in addition to the expertise asymmetry where communities lack the technical expertise required to scrutinise project details critically, placing them at a disadvantage in consultation processes. While the Directive requires covered companies to provide “relevant and comprehensive information” to facilitate meaningful consultations, information asymmetry between covered companies and communities mean that they (covered companies) retain superior knowledge regarding the types of information available and therefore retain the power to determine what information to disclose to stakeholders. This could undermine transparency, a problem that has been identified in relation to compliance with existing due diligence laws.
All roads to a remedy?
The Directive establishes a legal basis for civil liability (Article 22 (1)(a)). Accordingly, natural and legal persons can obtain full compensation on proof of breach (failure to prevent harm or bring it to an end), fault (that breach was intentional or negligent), causation and harm (Article 22 (1)). The establishment of a legal basis for civil litigation opens up a pathway for victims of adverse environmental impacts caused by covered companies (with the exception of business partners) to obtain remedies through transnational litigation. Access to remedies is a welcome measure for protecting the right to a healthy environment in Africa. However, the high standard of proof required of litigants could preclude recovery of full compensation given the evidentiary challenges associated with proving breach, fault and causation. This barrier is in addition to the structural and operational barriers that litigants typically confront in transnational litigation. The high cost of litigation places litigants from Africa at a disadvantage.
As most people affected by environmental damage are likely to be resource-challenged, they would be forced to rely on benefactors or litigation finance, both of which are not assured sources of financing. Even were litigants are able to successfully institute transnational litigation, enforcement of judgements is not automatic. As demonstrated by cases such as the Lago Agrio litigation, corporate defendants are willing to deploy their vast resources and expertise to resist enforcement of judgements. To avoid making the promise of full compensation illusory, member states will have to design creative national legislation that does more than address time limitations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, there is no doubt that the Directive seeks to reshape the impact of MNCs on global communities and, therefore, aligns with Article 24 of the African Charter and national legal provisions on the protection of the right to a healthy environment suitable to a people’s development. By requiring companies to identify, prevent, and address environmental impacts by companies, the Directive could significantly improve environmental protection in Africa. However, its exclusion of waste management and limitations on transnational litigation may hinder comprehensive environmental justice. Additionally, the Directive’s stakeholder engagement provisions, while promising, risk allowing companies to only superficially comply.
Editor’s note: this post is a continuation from the previous post of the same title.








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